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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ( 
DIANE DUNN, ( 
Defendant and Appellant. ( 
REPLY BRIEF 
) OF THE APPELLANT 
; Case No. 20030573-CA 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECKLESS DRIVING STATUTE EXPRESSLY 
INCLUDES ALL MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS INCLUDING 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
The Appellee answers Ms. Dunn's assertions of error by employing 
result-oriented reasoning which extends beyond the plain language of the 
statute to presume the legislature's intent. Appellee urges that "[t]he 
legislature obviously did not intend for DUI and other more serious offenses 
to be reduced to Reckless Driving." Brief of Appellee at 9 (emphasis 
added). Regardless of what one presumes the legislature desired or had in 
mind in writing the statute, due process and long standing rules of statutory 
construction confine that an analysis be conducted of the language 
articulated in the statute in question. 
1 
In her opening brief Ms. Dunn documented these appropriate rules of 
statutory construction. The plain language contained within a statute is to 
be interpreted as the intent of the statute unless an ambiguity exists within 
the language itself. See Brief of Appellant at 8-12. 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will 
not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are 
guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed 
according to its plain language. ... When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room 
is left for construction. 
Brendlev. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044,1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
In a recent case involving the meaning of a statute, the Utah Supreme 
Court echoed this ruling stating the following: 
In considering the meaning of a [statutory] provision, the 
analysis begins with the plain language of the provision. . . . We need 
not look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in 
it. Moreover, [t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, 
and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the 
same statute and with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters. 
State v. MacGuire. 2004 UT 4, |15 (citations omitted). 
Despite the protestations of the State, no ambiguity exists in the plain 
language of the Reckless Driving Statute. The Reckless Driving statute 
reads: 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
2 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; 
or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under 
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts 
within a single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). Ms. Dunn insists that 
the language in 41-6-45(1 )(b) is so plain on its face that any and all moving 
traffic violations as pronounced by the legislature in Title 41, Chapter 6 are 
expressly adopted as potential elements of the (l)(b) violation if committed 
in a series of violations with two others. The State says that the DUI 
statute is somehow exempted from this plain reading of the statute despite 
conceding that DUI is a moving traffic violation that falls under Title 41, 
Chapter 6, of the Traffic Rules and Regulations section of the code. Brief 
of Appellee at 6. 
In short, the State disagrees with the plain meaning encouraged by 
Ms. Dunn because it does not like the result. For example, the State does 
not cite to any specific language within the statute which is somehow or in 
some way ambiguous. Each of the result-oriented interpretations by the 
State requires this Court to reach beyond the plain language of the 
legislature and contort a different meaning. None of the interpretations of 
the State are justified first, because the language is unambiguous thereby 
forbidding any new construction of the plain language; and second, the State 
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fails to provide any extended analysis, historic or otherwise, which supports 
its position other than to impermissibly rewrite the statute and claim disdain 
for the result. Likewise, State v. Hernandez. 2003 UT App 276, relied on 
by the State, fails to address the statutory argument at all. By its plain 
language the DUI statute is an included part of the Reckless Driving statute 
provided the other two requisite traffic violations are present as exist in this 
case. 
Appellee pleads that the DUI statute and the Reckless Driving statute 
address wholly distinctive behaviors. Brief of Appellee at 10. Notably, the 
same can be said for Speeding (§ 41-6-46), Failure to Signal (§ 41-6-71) and 
any other traffic offense listed within the section. The argument is 
unhelpful because the plain language of the Reckless Driving statute 
expressly and unambiguously incorporates every traffic matter within Title 
41 and Chapter 6 of the Utah Code regardless of their distinctive behavior. 
It is a very simple matter for the legislature to exclude or exempt a particular 
traffic violation, if desired, from being included by spelling out the particular 
exempt violation. Numerous occurrences of such exemptions or exclusions 
exist in our code. See, e.g. § 76-5-404.1 and § 76-9-702.5, both statutes are 
examples of the legislature's ability and prior usage of expressly excluding 
or exempting more serious charges from a less serious charge. Therefore, 
had the legislature intended any traffic violation to be exempt from the 
Reckless Driving claim it could and would have said it was excluded. 
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The State says, "The defendant fails to explain how eliminating 
prosecutions under Utah's DUI statute would achieve securing the public's 
safety." Brief of Appellee at 9. Neither Ms. Dunn nor this Court is 
required to address this contention of the state. The legislature wrote the 
statute and if the inarguably plain meaning is something other than that 
which is desired, then the legislature can rewrite the statute as is their 
prerogative. As discussed in Ms. Dunn' opening brief, our Utah Supreme 
Court has addressed this very issue in a Shondel analysis in 1985. There the 
Court stated: 
This Court does not declare statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional 
because they could have been better drafted; indeed it has long been 
the law that we attempt to construe statutes to be constitutional. Nor 
are we concerned with legislative policy decisions embodied in 
statutes. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our responsibility to 
assure the rational and evenhanded application of the criminal laws. 
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all those who 
are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written 
so that there are significant differences between offenses and so that 
the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending 
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. 
That would be a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of 
law. The Legislature may make automobile homicide committed 
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot make the 
crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the 
prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or a misdemeanor. 
State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (citations omitted). 
This Court should resist the result-oriented interpretations provided by 
the State to affirm the trial court's erroneous decision, undoubtedly equally 
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motivated by the same desire to read a contrary result into an otherwise 
clearly articulated statute. This Court should reverse and remand the Dunn 
matter to the lower court to enter a sentence on the Reckless Driving 
violation as clearly indicated in the statute. 
POINT II. THE SHONDEL LINE OF CASES REQUIRE THAT MS. 
DUNN'S CONVICTION BE ENTERED FOR THE CRIME OF 
RECKLESS DRIVING. 
The State of Utah claims that State v. Shondel 435 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1969), and its progeny do not apply because the traffic offenses of Reckless 
Driving and DUI have different elements. A review of both statutes prior 
to the 2000 amendment would likely support the claim of the state. 
However, this claim inarguably fails when applied to the current language of 
§ 41-6-45(l)(b). Again, the statute now reads as follows: 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; 
or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under 
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts 
within a single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). In section (l)(b) the 
legislature has expressly made each and every moving violation in Title 41, 
6 
Chapter 6, as a crime and element of reckless driving.1 Once any three of 
those offenses are established then the three offenses merge together to 
create a reckless driving charge. As indicated above, DUI is not exempted 
from this statute. The State's argument refuses to recognize that the DUI 
statute, in its entirety, is an included offense just as are all other traffic 
offenses from Title 41, Chapter 6. Their position to the contrary is without 
merit and ignores the plain language of the statute and how each traffic 
offense with all its corresponding elements merge into the Reckless Driving 
under (l)(b). 
The State also claims that Shondel does not apply because the 
legislature did not intend that all traffic violations be merged into the 
Reckless Driving statute. Brief of Appellee at 12. This argument is wholly 
circular and in error. For reasons stated above, where no ambiguity exists 
and no exclusions or exemptions are expressed, then due process and the 
Shondel line of authority dictates that the discretion of the prosecutor to 
choose which statute applies is removed and the penalty of the lesser is 
appropriately assigned. 
1
 The State of Utah concedes that DUI is a moving traffic violation within 
41-6. Brief of Appellee at 6. 
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Because DUI is an element of the new reckless driving offense of 
subsection (l)(b) Shondel most certainly applies and the lower punishment 
of a B misdemeanor necessarily applies. 
POINT III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State complains that oral argument would not significantly aid the 
Court in deciding the case. Ms. Dunn disagrees. Rule 29 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure delineates that "oral argument will be allowed in all 
cases unless the court concludes: the appeal is frivolous, the issue has 
recently been authoritatively decided, or that the decisional process would 
not be significantly aided by the oral argument." Oral argument can help to 
clarify the positions of the parties that are only briefly provided to the Court 
in these pleadings. 
Ms. Dunn respectfully requests the opportunity to address the Court 
and believes oral argument unquestionably will aide the decisional process. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant DIANE DUNN respectfully requests that this Court to 
review the statutory construction issues and separate Shondel argument 
presented herein, and for all or any of the reasons stated, to correct the 
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decision of the trial court and reverse the conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence and remand the matter for a new sentencing for the corrected 
offense of Reckless Driving. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i ^ d a y of February, 2004. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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